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The Quinlan Case 
Dennis J. Horan 
This is an expanded version of 
a paper presented to the Medi-
cine and Law Committee of the 
American Bar Association, At-
lanta, Ga. in August, 1976. 
Horan, an attorney, is an in-
structor in law at the University 
of Chicago Law School, chair-
man of the Right to Live/Right 
to Die Committee of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, and co-
author and co-editor of Abortion 
and Social Justice, published by 
Sheed and Ward. 
Although its importance can-
not be overestimated, the deci-
sion of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in the matter of Karen 
Quinlan 1 bears little or no re-
semblance to the newspaper 
accounts of the case. Its impor-
tance is related more to the 
impact of the media than the 
logic of the opinion. In its opin-
ion of March 31, 1976 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court really 
addressed two rather diverse 
topics : (1) the Karen Quinlan 
case, and (2) the right of privacy 
in terminal illness. Whether it 
was necessary to discuss the lat-
ter in order to decide the former 
is questionable, and is a question 
which will be debated in the law 
reviews . 
The judgment in the case is 
very narrow and is in sharp con-
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trast to the wide breadth of 
issues discussed in the opinion. 
The judgment is contained in the 
last three pages of the opinion 
entitled "Declaratory Relief." In 
those pages the Court declared 
that upon the concurrence of the 
guardian and family of Karen the 
life support apparatus being ad-
ministered to her (a Bennett Res-
pirator) could be discontinued, 
but on certain conditions. These 
conditions were : (1) the concur-
rence of the responsible attend-
ing physicians who must con-
clude that there is no reasonable 
possibility of Karen 's ever emerg-
ing from her present comatose 
condition to a cognitive, sapient 
state; and (2) the concurrence 
and agreement by a hospital 
ethics committee that there is no 
reasonable possibility of Karen's 
ever emerging from her present 
comatose condition to a cogni-
tive, sapient state. 
Thereafter, withdrawal of the 
life support systems under those 
conditions shall be without any 
civil or criminal liability on the 
part of any participant, whether 
guardian, physician, hospital or 
others . 
The Court then remanded the 
case to the trial court for imple-
mentation of certain narrow de-
cisions: (1) to discharge the pres-
ent guardian, and (2) to appoint 
Linacre Quarterly 
the father, Joseph Quinlan, as 
guardian with full power to make 
decisions with regard to the iden-
tityof Karen's treating physicians. 
The narrowness of the actual 
Declaratory Relief is to be con-
trasted with the breadth of the 
body of the opinion which ad-
dresses itself to a whole series of 
issues, the discussion of which 
was not essential or even neces-
sary for the determination of the 
case. I contend that the same 
decision as was reached by the 
Court could have also been 
reached by the Court merely by 
applying current medical-legal 
law, without the necessity of in-
troducing such issues as the right 
of privacy or substitute judg-
ment. The mischief these con-
cepts will create remains to be 
seen.2 In view of the post-dec-
retal history of the case, and in 
view of Karen's survival for a 
lengthy period of time after re-
moval from the respirator, my 
conclusions seem even more apt. 3 
The court brushed aside Mr. 
Quinlan's contention that his First 
Amendment rights of religious 
iJeliefs were impinged upon. Nor 
did the Court recognize an inde-
pendent parental right of reli-
gious freedom to support the re-
lief requested. Similarly the 
Court disposed of the Quinlan's 
argument based upon cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
The Court did find in the con-
stitutional right of privacy a right 
to reject medical treatment. Be-
cause of Karen's incompetency 
and her inability to exercise that 
right, the Court concluded that 
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Karen's right of privacy may be 
asserted on her behalf by her 
guardian "under the peculiar cir-
cumstances here present."4 The 
court thus chose to decide the 
case on constitutional grounds 
rather than attempting a resolu-
tion of the issues on current 
legal-medical principles. My 
thesis is that the case could have 
been decided and the same result 
reached without resorting to con-
stitutional rights, and in particu-
lar the right of privacy. 
Resorting to constitutional 
grounds means that the Court's 
holding cannot be changed or 
altered by the legislature. A con-
stitutional amendment would be 
required . This can be a most dif-
ficult state of affairs in the reso-
lution of legal-moral-medical 
problems, since it forecloses fur-
ther social experimentation 
through legislation of other solu-
tions to the legal dilemmas which 
resuscitation poses . Alternative 
solutions to profound legal prob-
lems such as these should not be 
foreclosed by the premature use 
of constitutional grounds. For 
the same reasons, resort should 
first be had by the Court to legal-
medical precedents rather than 
constitutional principles . The law 
is only now beginning to cope 
with these profound medical-
legal problems, and haste in deci-
sion-making which may produce 
constitutional solutions which are, 
practically speaking, henceforth 
unalterable, should be avoided. 
The right to refuse medical 
treatment does not need con-
stitutional support. A physician 
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may not render treatment with-
out consent except in emergency 
situations. The fact that consent 
is necessary has never been con-
sidered to need statutory or con-
stitutional support. The right to 
reject medical treatment exists as 
a corollary to the necessity for 
consent to any touching. A com-
petent person has the right to 
refuse medical treatment, not as 
a constitutional right of privacy, 
but as a corollary of the common 
law tort rule that no one may 
treat him or her without that 
consent. This aspect of the right 
of privacy (refusal of medical 
treatment) is not constitutional 
in scope under the federal consti-
tution. It obviously exists now as 
a constitutional right in New Jer-
sey as a result of the opinion in 
the Quinlan case. 
In an attempt to limit the 
breadth of many of the com-
ments made, the Court con-
cluded several paragraphs of the 
opinion with the statement, 
"u nd er th e peculiar circum-
stances here present. "5 Why this 
should be repeatedly stated by 
the Court is unclear. Perhaps 
there was fear of the real nature 
of the issues which the Court 
knew the public thought was 
being decided. 
The Court stated that if a 
putative decision by Karen to 
permit this non-cognitive, vegeta-
tive existence to terminate by 
natural forces is regarded as a 
valuable incident of her right of 
privacy (i.e., she has a constitu-
tional right to reject medical 
treatment), then it should not be 
170 
discarded solely on the basis that 
her condition prevents her con-
scious exercise of that choice . 
S peaking in practicalities, the 
Court felt that the only way to 
prevent destruction of this right 
was to permit the guardian and 
family of Karen to render their 
best judgment as to whether she 
would exercise it in these circum-
stances. The Court then found 
that Karen's right of privacy to 
terminate medical treatment 
could be asserted in her behalf 
by her guardian and family 
"under the peculiar circumstances 
presented by this record."6 
Except in emergency situa-
tions where it is presumed, con-
sent is a condition precedent for 
the giving of medical treatment. 
For minors and incompetents, 
consent must be sought from the 
parent or guardian. The consent 
may be given by them where the 
treatment is beneficial, but not 
otherwise. For termination of 
therapy the rules are similar, but 
not the same. All treatment re-
quires consent, but the termina-
tion of therapy for medical rea-
sons does not, as long as the pa-
tient is not being abandoned by 
the physician. As applied to the 
situation at hand, these prin-
ciples mean that resuscitation 
therapy may be terminated 
where the prognosis for life (not 
meaningful life) is very poor and 
in the medical judgment of the 
attending physician continuation 
of the therapy is unwarranted. 
Consequently, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court need not have 
discussed the case as one requir-
ing the application of constitu-
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tional principles. Indeed, in 
doing so it has seemingly placed 
another burden on the shoulders 
of the physician. Presumably he 
now cannot terminate resuscita-
tive therapy without the consent 
of the parent or guardian. 
The Court next discusses what 
it labels "the medical factor. " 
Under this heading is placed the 
most far-reaching and unsettling 
aspec t of the case. Accepting the 
statement by the physicians in 
the case that their decision not 
to terminate the use of the res-
pirator as a form of medical 
treatment was made according to 
prevailing medical practice and 
standards, the Court nonetheless 
determined that it should re-eval-
uate the applicability of the med-
ical standards themselves.7 The 
Court specifically indicated that 
the decision of the physicians in 
charge of the case was consistent 
with the proofs below as to the 
"then"8 existing medical stand-
ards and practices. It even indi-
cated that Judge Muir was cor-
rect in declining to authorize 
withdrawal of the respirator as 
the law then stood. Then, the 
Court addressed this, the most 
profound issue of the case, in a 
classic of unintelligible legal 
jargon: 
"The question is whether there is 
such internal consistency and ra-
tionality in the application of such 
standards as should warrant their 
constituting an inel uctable bar to 
the effectuation of substantive re-
lief for plaintiff at the hands of the 
Court. We have conclud ed not. "9 
In my opinion, this section of 
the Quinlan case will have the 
most profound effect on medical 
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practice in future years. For here 
the Court held that it could over-
rule the medical and moral stand-
ards prevailing in the profession 
of medicine. Judge Muir had held 
to the contrary, i.e., that the 
medical standards must be deter-
mined by the medical profession 
and could not be overruled by 
the Court.10 But the New Jersey 
Supreme Court took particular 
pains to address this issue in a 
manner which indicates that it, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
would determine what the moral, 
medical and legal standard is as 
applicable to the termination of 
resuscitative methods. Lest there 
be any doubt about that conclu-
sion, the Court reiterates: 
"In summary of the present point 
of this opinion , we conclude that 
the state of the pertinent standards 
and practices which guided the 
attending physicians in this matter 
is not such as would justify this 
Court in deeming itself bound or 
controlled thereby in responding 
to the case for declaratory relief 
established by the parties on the 
record before us. "ll 
It would be much simpler if 
the Court had said that the at-
tending physicians were wrong in 
their understanding of the pre-
vailing standard. But the Court 
says they were right.llA We 
must remember that courts have 
not heretofore dictated to physi-
cians as to how they will conduct 
the practice of their profession. 
Even a judicial finding of mal-
practice usually requires the tes-
timony of another physician that 
the applicable standard of medi-
cal practice has been breached. 
Where expert testimony is not 
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necessary, it is because the stand-
ard is self-evident or proved with-
out oral testimony. Here , how-
ever, a state supreme court has 
decreed that a medical standard 
which, on the record below, was 
apparently accepted by all as the 
prevailing standard, can be dis-
carded and replaced by another 
seemingly contrary standard. 
Yet , even that pronouncement 
seems to be at odds with the 
holding in the judgment that the 
attending physicians cannot turn 
off the respirator until both they 
and a hospital committee have 
decided that the treatment is 
hopeless. Such inconsistencies do 
not persuade a careful reader of 
th e efficacy of the opinion. 
Under malpractice laws, what 
courts say is the prevailing medi-
cal standard becomes normative 
for the physician and mandates 
his future course of conduct. 
The Court also holds that ter-
minating the respirator in this 
case would not be criminal homi-
cide because death would be 
from existing natural causes. 
However, even if it were to be 
regarded as homicide, the Court 
says it would not be unlawful be-
cause " a death resulting from 
such an act would not come 
within the scope of the homicide 
statutes proscribing only the un-
lawful killing of another."12 The 
Court brings the person who 
turns off the respirator under the 
protection of the consitution by 
declaring that the one who exer-
cises the constitutional right of 
privacy for another under these 
circumstances cannot be the sub-
ject matter of prosecution if the 
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other individual himself would 
not be subject to prosecution for 
refusing medical treatment. 
Then, in a most extraordinary 
statement, the Court states: " and 
under the circumstances of this 
case these same principles would 
apply to and negate a valid prose-
cu tion for attempted suicide 
were there still such a crime in 
this state." 13 Such a crime, " aid-
ing suicide," is a crime under the 
proposed New Jersey Penal 
Code. The Court points out that 
even if the new criminal code be-
comes law, " this provision, if en-
acted, would not be incrimina-
tory in circumstances similar to 
those presented in this case. "14 I 
have not before seen a court 
render a declaratory judgment on 
a statute not yet in existence. 
The case must be considered 
in the light of the facts as pre-
sented to the trial court and to 
the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey. At that time it was assumed 
by all participants that turning 
off the respirator meant almost 
immediate death for Karen Quin-
lan. Consequently, the case was 
argued in the trial court and on 
appeal as though the act of ter-
minating a form of medical treat-
ment constituted voluntary or in-
voluntary euthanasia. The sub-
sequent history of t he case, and 
the fact that Karen Quinlan con-
tinues to survive without the aid 
of the respirator, has put the case 
in its proper perspective . That 
perspective is this: the Karen 
Quinlan case concerned a medi-
cal decision as to whether or not 
a certain type of medical therapy 
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should be continued in the case. 
That judgment should first of all 
be a medical judgment made by 
the physicians on the case. If the 
family concurs with that judg-
ment, well and good. If, how-
ever, the family opts for a differ-
ent form of medical treatment 
than the physicians on the case, 
the only practical answer is for 
the physicians to resign or to fire 
the physicians and replace them 
with other physicians. This, how-
ever, can be most difficult, as 
anyone who has been involved in 
such a case knows. Few physi-
cians will involve themselves in 
taking over a case under those 
circumstances. This is seemingly 
what has occurred since the 
Court's opinion of March 31, 
1976. The disagreement between 
the attending physicians and the 
family precipitated this litiga-
tion. In their judgment the at-
tending physicians felt the case 
was not medically hopeless, and 
they refused to terminate the use 
of the respirator. Since the opin-
ion, the same treating physicians 
have successfully weaned Karen 
from the respirator and she has 
been transferred to a nursing 
home. Given these basic disagree-
m ents between physician and 
family, who prevails? 
Ordinarily one would expect 
the physician to resign in the 
face of such disagreement. How 
can he resign, however, without 
arranging for follow-up care (or 
be accused of abandonment), 
and what other physician wants 
to step into such a situation? The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey 
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solved this dilemma by giving the 
guardian (the father) the right to 
select the physician, even to the 
extent of firing the current 
physicians. 
But on the important issue -
the disagreement - it still held 
that the successor physicians 
must first agree that the case is 
hopeless before therapy can be 
discontinued. The Court then 
added another layer to the prob-
lem by requiring a hospital com-
mittee to do the same. This is the 
most puzzling aspect of the case. 
Presumably, the Court assumed 
that other physicians would be 
found after pUblication of the 
opinion who would take the case 
and would agree with the Court's 
opinion that the mere existence 
of a non-cognitive state or non-
sapient state (whatever the Court 
means) is adequate grounds to 
stop the therapy . 
Under current medical-legal 
principles, the Court had only to 
examine the facts and declare 
that a physician is authorized 
under the standards of medical 
practice to discontinue a form of 
therapy which in his medical 
judgment is useless. He is not 
mandated by the law to render 
useless treatment, nor does the 
standard of medical care require 
useless treatment. Under those 
circumstances if the treating 
physicians have determined that 
continued use of the respirator 
was useless, then they could de-
cide to discontinue it without 
fear of civil or criminal liability. 
Thereafter reappointing the par-
ent as guardian with the obvious 
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power to discharge the physi-
cians if they disagreed with the 
family, was the only required 
solution. Whether the family can 
then find physicians who agree 
with them and will take the case 
is a separate issue. 
By " useless" is meant that the 
continued use of the therapy 
cannot and does not improve the 
prognosis for recovery. Even if 
the therapy is necessary to main-
tain stab iii ty, such therapy 
should not be mandatory where 
the ultimate prognosis is hope-
less. This does not mean that 
ordinary means of life supports, 
such as food and drink, can be 
discontinued merely because the 
ultimate prognosis is hopeless. It 
does mean, however, that physi-
cians can use good, practical, 
common medical sense in de-
termining whether or not treat-
ment is efficacious and, if it is 
not, then cease the treatment. 
By "hopeless" is meant that 
the prognosis for life (not mean-
ingful life) is very poor. The fact 
that someone may not return to 
"sapient or cognitive life" may 
or may not fulfill the require-
ment, depending on other medi-
cal factors, but in and of itself it 
does not. As was said by the 
Supreme Court of West Germany: 
"Where human li fe exists, human 
dignity is present to it ; it is not de-
cisive that the bearer of this dignity 
himse lf be conscious of it and 
knows personally how to preserve 
it."15 
It seems that in the Quinlan 
case all participants assumed that 
just as night follows day , death 
would follow the termination of 
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the respirator. Subsequent facts 
have proved this to be incorrect 
and have undermined the force 
of this decision. Perhaps, how-
ever, subsequent facts have 
placed this decision in its proper 
perspective. Where the issue is a 
medical one, namely the termina-
ti on of useless therapy, that 
question is one which should be 
decided by the physicians, not 
by the courts. All the Court here 
had to do was find that such a 
medical decision does not violate 
the law. 
The problem with the Quinlan 
case is that, according to the low-
er court, all the physicians agreed 
that the case was not hopeless. If 
this is a reasonable medical judg-
ment, then one can only con-
clude that, in the collective mind 
of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, and although unsaid, 
either the doctors were factually 
wrong in their conclusion or 
medically hopeless means " non-
sapient or non-cognitive." What 
does this mean for the retardate? 
If there is a lesson to be 
learned from the Quinlan case, it 
seems to me that one lesson is 
for the court to interfere less 
with medicine and to spend more 
time analyzing the legal issues in-
volved, and in particular the im-
pact those legal issues will have 
on other areas of the law. 
Already we see the movement 
for the legalization of voluntary 
and involuntary euthanasia. Duff 
and Campbell have stated their 
case for the legalization of in-
voluntary euthanasia in the spe-
cial care nursery,16 In its provi-
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sional report of Dec. 16, 1975, 
the Council of Europe draft rec-
ommendation by the Committee 
on Social and Health Questions 
opts for both voluntary and in-
voluntary euthanasia of the in-
curably ill, or even those whose 
cerebral functions have irreversi-
bly ceased.17 Certainly the Quin-
lan case should not be considered 
as a step in that direction since 
the Court takes great pains to 
distinguish between the substitut-
ed judgment of a parent or 
guardian to terminate medical 
treatment for an incompetent 
and the deliberate, intentional 
taking of another's life. However, 
one cannot but express the con-
cern previously stated by Prof. 
Yale Kamisar in his famous ar-
ticle that the slippery slope once 
begun is indeed difficult to ter-
minate, and where it will ter-
minate is anyone's guess. 18 
The second and more impor-
tant lesson should be learned by 
the medical profession. If that 
profession wants to avoid inter-
ference by the courts it ought to 
liaison with the bar to seek co-
operation on these difficult is-
sues long before litigation begins. 
Such liaison should be perma-
nently institutionalized by the 
creation of a standing and fund-
ed committee composed of 
physicians, lawyers and moral-
ists. This committee should be 
funded by the American Bar 
Association and the American 
Medical Association, although 
totally independent of either. It 
should have adequate staff. 
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The committee's main func-
tion should be the issuance of 
legal-moral-medical "opinions" 
on these and similar issues. Such 
"opinions" can be the result of 
study, research, and even testi-
mony before the committee by 
interested persons. The moral 
persuasiveness of such "opin-
ions" will depend on the prestige 
and impartiality of the commit-
tee. Certainly any such com-
mittee will experience the usual 
problems to which such institu-
tions are heir, but its existence 
seems imperative to the current 
and future needs of both medi-
cine and law. 
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